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Introduction
The international transmission of technologies and innovation is a major driver of global productivity growth. An important device in this process are corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&As) which provide direct inter-regional links between rms and open up channels for technology transfers (Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2008) . However, whether or not the potential productivity gain in these transactions materializes strongly depends on the post-merger behavior of the combined rm. 1 In this paper, we investigate how rm-level adjustment after M&As is aected by dierences in prot taxation between the target and the acquirer.
These dierences regularly occur in cross-border mergers and are thus likely to inuence productivity improvements in the rms involved in these deals.
Our main nding is that tax dierentials between the target and the acquirer location reduce post-merger productivity gains by distorting the reallocation of activity within the combined rm. Since the rm's objective is to maximize its net prot, it takes into account both the productivity and the corporate tax implications of a potential location choice. If the more productive unit resides in the location with the more favorable tax regime, the resulting allocation choice assigns production to the most productive units irrespective of the actual tax rate dierential. However, if the more ecient unit happens to reside in a location with a higher tax burden, rms face a trade-o. Shifting activity to the high-tax location raises overall productivity but also increases the tax burden on the resulting prots.
For large enough tax dierences, the rm allocates activity to the less productive but more protable unit. With regard to the overall productivity of the merged rm, this decision is inecient and leads to a lower gain in productivity resulting from the M&A. This mechanism only occurs when rms cannot separate the location of productive activity from the location of its taxation. If rms were able to assign prots to the location of their preference (i.e. the location with the lowest tax rate), tax dierences would not be relevant. In practice, such prot shifting activity is limited by domestic and international regulations and because rms usually incur some shifting cost. Nevertheless, the impact of tax dierentials may be mitigated if rms engage in prot shifting activities such as transfer pricing.
The described eect is generally not unique to M&As but would be caused by any event that changes tax dierentials within multinational groups (e.g. tax reforms). However, the reallocation of activity within existing groups of rms is usually associated with a high xed cost and thus rarely observed. In contrast, the completion of an M&A transaction provides an opportunity to exploit returns to scale and consolidate units operating in the merging rms that perform similar functions. As a consequence, substantial restructuring within the newly formed enterprise is common. In such an environment, the xed cost of a reallocation of functions is weighted less heavily and rms are likely to react to tax dierentials.
Below we formulate a simple theoretical model to demonstrate this mechanism. We then investigate the impact of tax dierentials on merger-induced productivity gains empirically.
For this purpose we combine data on M&As from Bureau van Dijk's Zephyr database with rm-level information on inputs and outputs from the AMADEUS and ORBIS databases.
First, we derive total factor productivity (TFP) for each individual rm within the sample of industry peers using the estimation method of Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) . We then compute the TFP change resulting from an M&A deal and relate it to the absolute tax dierence between the target and the acquirer. Our estimations, which include a large set of country-, deal-, and rm-specic controls, suggest that an increase in the absolute tax dierential by 1 percentage point lowers the merger-induced productivity gain by 4.5%. We also show that this eect is mitigated when transfer pricing regulations are less strict. In a complementary analysis, we turn to the underlying mechanisms of this eect. Results of a xed eects model and an event study suggest that the impact of the tax dierential is asymmetric in the sense that the observed eect is mainly driven by deals where the level of taxation in the target location is lower than the one in the acquirer location. Following these transactions, the adjustment process in the target is hampered by the distorting tax incentive as rms make less reductions to employment and capital in the target rms involved. This nding is consistent with the notion that rms leave activity in the location with the lower tax burden which raises after-tax prot but also implies that some productivity gains from the M&A are not realized and the overall increase in productivity is smaller or even negative.
Our paper thus contributes novel insights to the growing literature on corporate M&As and taxation. Various studies have identied tax policy to be an important driver of M&A activity (e.g. Di Giovanni, 2005; Erel et al., 2012; Feld et al., 2016a,b) . 2 Furthermore, taxes do not only inuence whether but also how rms conduct M&As. For example, Ayers et al. (2004) and Faccio & Masulis (2005) show that capital gains taxation aects the method of payment in M&As. All of these studies investigate the role of tax rates as a determinant of the observed pattern of M&As and thus essentially focus on the eect of taxation before the M&A is completed. In contrast, our paper highlights the importance of the tax environment after the M&A completion. Existing studies with regard to this aspect have mainly looked into the importance of taxation on nancial variables. For instance, Ayers et al. (2003) and Huizinga et al. (2012) study realized deal values and show that shareholder-level taxation has a strong eect on deal premiums. In our analysis, we are interested in real outcomes of M&A. Huizinga & Voget (2009) and Voget (2011) show that taxes are an important determinant for the post-merger choice of headquarter location within the merged rm.
However, while these allocation choices constitute real behavioral responses of rms, they have only minor eects on the structure of production within the rm. Our investigation focuses on taxation as a determinant of post-merger allocation of productive input factors and therefore reveals new insights into how tax dierences aect the productive process and the evolution of productivity within the rm.
Thus, we also complement the large literature on productivity eects of M&As. Generally, M&As are perceived as an opportunity for productivity improvements. Results by Li (2013) suggest that this potential is indeed realized, mostly because the acquiring rm uses input factors of the target more eciently. Other M&A outcomes that may have a positive impact on rm productivity are an increased level of innovation (Stiebale, 2016) , knowledge transfers (Bresman et al., 1999; Bena & Li, 2014) and increased management eciency (Wang & Xie, 2009) . For cross-border takeovers, the positive eect of M&A on productivity is probably less pronounced. Foreign rms usually acquire the most productive rms in a country (Criscuolo & Martin, 2009 ) but the integration of these rms into the multinational group is more complex such that productivity improvements are realized only after a longer period of adjustment (Harris & Robinson, 2002) . Indeed, a recent study by Wang & Wang (2015) nds no dierence in the productivity eect of domestic and foreign acquisitions in a large sample of M&As in China. The impact of cross-border acquisitions on productivity probably depends on a large range of country-pair characteristics. In our analysis, we argue that international taxation is a relevant factor in this regard. We thus provide an important determinant of the realization of post-merger productivity gains which may help explain part of the ambiguity in previous studies on M&A and productivity.
Finally, our paper advances the debate on whether and how foreign prots should be taxed in the presence of international M&As. Becker & Fuest (2010) and Devereux et al. (2015) emphasize that the answer depends on the resource allocation mechanism within the rm after the merger. If adjustment in one part of the rm aects production in another part, tax dierentials distort the allocation mechanism and lead to sub-optimal outcomes.
Since a tax on foreign income may avoid these dierentials, such a policy is superior to an exemption regime in this case. We argue that this situation occurs in the post-merger allocation of corporate activity and provide empirical evidence for the loss that arises in the form of foregone productivity gains from M&As when tax neutrality is not ensured.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we develop a theoretical model to formally analyze the relationship between merger-induced productivity changes and tax dierentials.
We explain our empirical strategy in Section 3 and describe the data in Section 4. Results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 M&As, Taxation and Productivity Gains 2.1 Tax Dierentials and Productivity Change Through Reallocation of Activity after M&As
In this section we develop a simple theoretical framework to analyze the impact of tax rate dierences on the realization of productivity gains in M&As. We consider a merger or acquisition involving two rms, a and b. Each of these rms consists of a set of separable units that each perform a dierent function and also dier in their total factor productivity with respect to this function. Prior to the merger, a subset of functions is performed in both
rms. An obvious example are cross-divisional functions such as distribution, promotion or research and development. Once the deal is completed, the management decides for each of these functions whether the respective task is performed by a unit in a or b. This reallocation of activity is a potential source of post-merger productivity gains if a particular function is assigned to the unit that is more productive with respect to this task. However, as managers maximize net prot rather than output, the allocation decision may also be aected by other factors such as taxes, which distort the allocation decision. 3 We show that tax dierentials between the merged rms may lead to an allocation of functions that is inecient with respect to productivity. As a consequence, tax dierentials reduce or even revert productivity gains resulting from the merger.
We begin by deriving the prot of a unit performing function i in rm s = a, b. It is given by
where k s (i) and l s (i) are capital and labor input of rm s in the unit performing function i, r s and w s are the respective input prices and A s (i) is the total factor productivity of the unit performing function i in rm s. Within the unit, we assume decreasing returns to scale, α + β < 1. 4 For given input prices, the management of the rm chooses the level of productive inputs for each individual unit i so as to maximize the unit-specic prot π s (i).
This yields the set of optimal input choices l *
where γ = 1 1−α−β . Substituting the input choices back into the prot function, we obtain the optimal prot
where
is a function of input prices and is decreasing in both r s and w s .
We rst consider the post-merger production allocation decision without taxes. To simplify our derivation, we assume that factor prices are identical for both rms, such that
This assumption is realistic, for example if capital input is purchased on the international capital market and wages reect some form of quality-adjusted labor compensation.
The latter can be assumed to be homogeneous across dierent locations if the labor market is suciently integrated. Abstracting from input price dierentials allows us to clearly isolate the eect of tax dierentials on post-merger productivity changes. We note, however, that frictions in the markets for labor or capital may preclude uniform input prices and we therefore relax this assumption in our empirical analysis below.
To simplify notation, we dene the dierence in total factor productivity between a and b for the unit performing function i by
The objective function of the management is the overall prot of the rm which is the aggregate of the prots of the individual functions, Π s = i∈I π s (i) di. Π s is maximized by optimally allocating the individual functions to the most protable unit, that is, the management allocates the function i to a unit in a instead of b if
and vice versa. 5 In this case, only the productivity dierential λ (i) determines where activity is located and the resulting post-merger productivity for the unit performing function i in the merged entity is given by
In order to derive the total productivity change in the combined rm, we aggregate the productivity of each individual unit. For analytical reasons, we assume that there is a large continuum of functions i ∈ I. The overall productivity of the merged rm is dened as the weighted aggregate of the productivity of all units, A = i∈I ω (i) A (i) di, where ω i are the unit-specic weights with i∈I ω (i) di = 1 that depict the importance of each unit in the combined rm. 6
We assume that in the merged entity, a subset of functions J is of the interchangeable sort described above while a subset of functions H are unique to each rm. The overall productivity prior to the merger is thus given by
The productivity of the units performing the interchangeable functions is again given by the weighted mean of the productivity in both rms where 0 < z < 1 is the relative weight of rm a in the merging entity. After the merger, productivity in each of these units corresponds to the productivity of the respective units in one of the rms. The overall productivity is then given by
Eventually, we are interested in the productivity change after the merger or acquisition is completed. We dene this change as the dierence of overall productivity before and after the merger and denote it by Γ:
Let λ (i) be distributed across some interval λ ,λ . We can then rewrite expression (8) in the following way
Expression (9) denes the productivity change as the weighted sum of productivity changes realized by allocating functions. Here, we abstract from taxes and potential factor price differentials such that the management allocates each function to the most productive location with respect to this function. As a consequence, the merger-induced productivity change is positive, Γ ≥ 0. Note, that expression (9) comprises both cases where each rm has a productivity advantage in some functions and cases where one rm is generally more productive than the other (e.g. λ (i) > 0 ∀i). The latter case often occurs in acquisitions when a large market leader takes over a smaller rm.
We now introduce tax dierentials to our model. For simplicity, we assume that input costs are fully deductible such that the after-tax prot of the unit performing function i in rm s is given by (1 − τ s ) π * s (i). When allocating functions between the two rms, the management now maximizes the overall after-tax prot of the merged rm such that it allocates function i to a instead of b if
When taxes are identical for both rms, τ a = τ b , we haveτ = 1 and the setting is identical to the case without taxes as no distortions are expected without tax dierentials.
However, if taxation diers between the two rms,τ = 1, the management may allocate some activity to the rm with lower productivity but higher after-tax prot. The expression for the productivity change now readŝ
The last term Λ (τ ) describes the unrealized productivity gains that are caused by the distorting eect of tax dierentials with regard to the allocation of functions. It disappears if τ a = τ b as limτ →1 Λ = 0. Note that we have Λ ≤ 0 irrespective of the direction of the tax dierential. This implies that any tax dierence between the target and acquirer location may lead to distorted allocations and thus reduces productivity gains resulting from the merger. Also,Γ does not need to be positive. For example, consider the case where rm a is more productive in all units, but is taxed substantially more such thatτ is very large. In this extreme case, all functions are performed by the less productive location because of the tax dierence and the productivity change is negative.
Furthermore, Λ is a decreasing function of the absolute tax dierential. To illustrate this, consider the situation where τ b > τ a such thatτ > 1 or τ a > τ b such thatτ < 1. In both cases, an increase in the absolute tax dierential ∆τ = |τ a − τ b | raises |τ | and leads to a decline in Λ. Thus, the merger-induced productivity change is a negative function of the absolute tax dierential:
2.2 Cross-Border Prot Shifting
So far, we have assumed that statutory tax rate dierentials between merging rms correctly reect the actual dierence in taxation as perceived by the management. This is the case if the prot generated in each subsidiary of the merged rm is correctly attributed to the location of activity. In an integrated company, this could, for example, be achieved through adequate transfer pricing. In practice, however, rms may be able to manipulate their effective tax burden through prot shifting (e.g. see Hines & Rice, 1994; Huizinga et al., 2008) . While previous studies have identied various forms of international prot shifting that use very dierent shifting vehicles 7 , all of these approaches have in common that they reduce the tax payments in high tax locations of a multinational company by shifting part of the prot generated there to low-tax locations within the group. This leads to a convergence of eective tax rates in the various aliate locations of the rm towards the lowest statutory rate in the multinational enterprise.
In the context of our framework above, this implies that the presence of prot shifting leads to a decrease in the absolute tax dierential. We formalize this notion by assuming that a xed proportion 0 < φ < 1 may be shifted between the two entities after the merger. 8
As the rm maximizes after-tax prot, shifting occurs only towards the location with a lower tax rate. The eective tax rate in location s is then given by
φ can be viewed as a function of the strictness of transfer pricing regulations and prot shifting opportunities between a and b. Substituting this into the absolute tax rate dierential, we obtain ∆τ = (1 − φ) |τ a − τ b | where it is apparent that more prot shifting opportunities (i.e. higher φ) imply a smaller eective tax rate dierential. Furthermore, we note that 7 See Dharmapala (2014) for a comprehensive survey. 8 Economic models usually assume that prot shifting induces some cost that is a convex function of the amount shifted (e.g. Hines & Rice, 1994) . In our reduced-form expression, this would imply that φ is a function of the tax rate dierential. However, since shifting is constrained to the realized prot, we still have 0 < φ < 1 and would thus obtain the same results with respect to the eect of the tax rate dierential on the post-merger productivity change as described in our more simple model.
such that an increase in the share of shifted prots mitigates the negative eect of statutory tax rate dierentials on the productivity change after the merger. For example, we expect that the distorting eect of tax dierentials in a cross-border merger is less severe if loose regulations regarding transfer pricing allow the management to manipulate prot allocation and thus narrow the dierence in the eective tax burden between the two locations.
International Taxation
In the following, we briey describe how tax dierentials between dierent locations of a multinational enterprise may arise in the international tax system. 9 When analyzing the impact of tax rate dierentials on the productivity change after an M&A deal, the relevant perspective is that of the management of the merged rm. Most M&A deals take the form of an acquisition and it is thus reasonable to assume that allocation decisions are taken from the perspective of the acquirer country. In the following we always refer to the tax rate faced by the acquiring rm when describing a tax rate as eective. The relevant tax rate dierential is thus the dierence between the tax rate on prots that the acquirer rm receives from the target in the form of dividends and the tax rate on prots realized at the acquirer location. The tax burden in each location depends on the statutory corporate income tax rate and the withholding tax rate (if applicable) for inter-corporate dividends.
The resulting dierence depends strongly on the approach taken by the acquirer country to relieve rms of double taxation. The exemption method, which is applied by most European countries, fully or partially exempts foreign income from corporate taxation. The tax burden for prots received from the target is thus determined by the corporate income and withholding taxes in the target location, and the resulting tax rate dierential is mainly driven by cross-border dierences in these tax rates. Some countries, like the United States and, until 2009, Japan and the United Kingdom, apply the credit method instead. With this approach, foreign income is taxed at the domestic corporate tax rate but taxes paid abroad are credited against the domestic tax liability. This credit is usually limited to the amount of domestic tax payments due. As a consequence, tax dierentials only arise when the eective tax rate of the acquirer country is below that of the target country. Credit regimes dier in the scope of the credit. A direct credit only considers the withholding tax paid abroad while indirect credits also include the underlying taxation of corporate prots.
For our empirical analysis, we compute for each individual M&A deal from the perspective of the acquiring rm the eective tax rates on prots realized by the target and the acquirer, respectively. We then use the absolute dierence between these eective tax rates one year after the completion of the M&A deal as a proxy for the expected post-merger tax rate dierential that determines the allocation within the merged rm. When determining the tax dierential, we take into account international dierences in statutory tax rates as 
well as the treatment of foreign prots for tax purposes in the acquirer country. Table 1 describes the computation of the absolute tax rate dierential for the various double tax relief methods. The latter may either be based on unilateral approaches, bilateral tax treaties or multilateral agreements such as the Parent-subsidiary Directive which requires European Union (EU) and European Economic Area (EEA) members to exempt prots of substantial holdings in other member states from domestic taxation. Furthermore, we check whether nal withholding taxes apply upon repatriation of foreign prots. Again, the level of these taxes depends on domestic legislation as well as the existence of bilateral or multilateral agreements.
3 Empirical Strategy
Identication
The objective of this paper is to analyze how tax dierentials between the acquirer and the target rm aect the impact of the merger on the total factor productivity of the combined rm. For this purpose we estimate a reduced form of equation (11) by relating the mergerinduced change in productivity to the absolute tax dierential. Our empirical model takes the following form:
Our theoretical analysis suggests that the relationship between the productivity change and the tax rate dierential is probably non-linear such that using the simple dierence of TFP before and after the merger is not appropriate. Instead, we use the dierence in the logarithms of TFP before and after the merger. This transformation mitigates the problem of outliers and turns out to be the most appropriate among a range of specications (see
Appendix A.2).
A P re j and A
P ost j
are the average estimated TFPs of the combined rm that emerges from deal j in the observable years before and after the completion of the M&A deal, respectively.
Below, we explain in more detail how TFP is estimated. A major advantage of analyzing the TFP of the combined rm rather than focusing on the eect in the acquirer or target rm is that we avoid tax-driven measurement errors in the input variables. These may occur if rms engage in ctitious relocation of economic activity after the merger. For example, a rm may use transfer pricing to assign labor expenses to the high-tax location in the merged rm. This would raise labor input there without aecting the output in this location and thus would seemingly induce a decline in productivity of the high-tax aliate while total factor productivity would appear to increase in the low-tax aliate. However, since there was no actual reallocation of resources, this change in productivity would be misleading.
More precisely, even though the perceived productivity change would certainly be a result of the tax dierential between the two locations, it would not constitute the real productivity eect that we are interested in but would rather be a result of tax-optimizing nancial accounting. Analyzing the TFP of the combined rm avoids this problem because articial relocations of productive factors net out when consolidating acquirer and target rm.
The tax dierential is dened as ∆τ jlk = |τ l − τ k | where τ k is the top statutory tax rate on corporate prots realized in the acquirer location and τ l is the eective tax rate one year after the completion of deal j from the perspective of the acquirer on prots realized by the target rm. The coecient of interest is α 1 which measures the eect of one percentage point of absolute dierence in target and acquirer tax rates on the productivity change resulting from the M&A deal. According to our theoretical model we expect α 1 to be negative.
We also check whether a certain type of tax dierential drives our result by disaggregating ∆τ jlk into positive and negative dierentials, ∆τ + jlk and ∆τ
In our estimation, we control for various deal-, rm-and location-specic variables that might aect the productivity change and post-merger performance more generally in line with the previous literature. 10 X j is a vector of deal characteristics. Since most of the variation in ∆τ lk stems from cross-border deals which themselves might have a particular eect on rm productivity, we include a dummy that indicates whether a deal involves two rms located in dierent countries. Furthermore, we include dummies that are equal to one when the takeover resulted from a hostile bid, when target shareholders where paid in stocks rather than cash, when the deal included a capital increase and when the acquirer rm already had a toehold in the target rm before the acquisition was announced. respective locations. On the rm level, these include the relative size of both rms measured by the acquirer to target ratio of total assets, leverage, which is dened as the ratio of current liabilities to current assets, rm age and an indicator for listed acquirers. We also account for relevant factors on the country level by controlling for wage dierentials between target and acquirer location which are proxied by the logarithmic ratio of acquirer to target GDP per capita, as well as, the logarithm of GDP and GDP per capita growth. Since domestic taxes might also have direct eects on rm productivity, we include the statutory corporate tax rate of the target in our regression. 11 Furthermore, we include the logarithm of the distance between the capitals of the acquirer and target country and a dummy that indicates if the merging rms are both located inside the European Union.
Each estimation contains a set of xed eects ψ which comprise target and acquirer country-xed eects, target and acquirer industry-xed eects (2-digit US SIC code) and year-xed eects. The variable of interest ∆τ jlk mainly varies across target and acquirer country pairs such that we cluster standard errors on the country pair level. 12
Our theoretical model predicts that the eect of the tax dierential is less pronounced when rms are able to easily allocate prots to the location with the more favorable tax rate. We test this notion in our empirical framework by interacting ∆τ jlk with an indicator for the looseness of transfer pricing regulations in the target and acquirer location for a deal, LOOSE jlk . This variable thus exploits both variation across country pairs and within country pairs as transfer pricing legislation changes over time. It is equal to one whenever in both the target and the acquirer country, the applicable transfer pricing regulations do not include a documentation requirement by law. We focus on the documentation requirement since the existence of transfer pricing regulations alone does not impose a sucient constraint on corporate prot shifting if rms are not obliged to properly explain the assigned transfer prices to the tax authorities. Furthermore, previous studies suggest that documentation requirements indeed constrain international prot shifting (e.g. Beer & Loeprick, 2015; Beuselinck et al., 2015) . 13 Our empirical model is dened as follows:
As above, we expect α 1 to be negative while α 2 should be positive and capture the mitigating eect of loose transfer pricing rules on the impact of the tax dierential. More precisely, α 1 ≥ α 2 with α 1 = α 2 indicating that the eect of the tax dierential on the productivity change may be completely eliminated if transfer pricing rules are suciently loose.
Transfer pricing regulation in the two locations of the merging rms may not be equally important for the productivity change. For example, it may be more relevant for the acquirer 11 We note that this may be correlated with the absolute tax rate dierential and also run regressions without the statutory tax rate in the target location as control variable to check whether collinearity drives our ndings. In these estimations we obtain very similar results.
12 To verify the robustness of our results, we have also conducted a regression analysis with a two-way clustering of standard errors as suggested by Cameron et al. (2012) and again obtained signicant coecients. 13 A comprehensive overview of the legislation regarding transfer pricing documentation in a large number of countries is provided by Zinn et al. (2014) . location if most of the transfer pricing adjustments are taken in the headquarter. Furthermore, the strictness of transfer pricing regulations may be more important in the location with the higher eective tax rate from which prot is shifted away. We investigate this asymmetry by interacting the absolute tax rate dierential ∆τ jlk with a set of dummies Having explored the relationship between tax dierentials and productivity changes on the deal level, we conduct a further inquiry to investigate the mechanisms underlying our result. Our theoretical model makes no assertion to what extent tax dierentials aect productivity gains in the acquirer or the target rm. Assuming a merger between similar rms, the eect is expected to be symmetric. However, in practice, this may not necessarily be the case: Acquirer rms are often much larger (e.g. Moeller et al., 2004) and also more productive (e.g. Schoar, 2002) . It is thus likely that the inecient relocation described above which results in lower overall productivity gains occurs more often with respect to the target, that is, merged rms do not eciently relocate to the more productive acquirer if the target location has a lower tax rate. Furthermore, the management of the merged rm often originates from the acquiring company and therefore may be less reactive towards tax dierentials that induce a (inecient) relocation away from the acquirer location. From a methodological perspective, an explanation for such a nding may be that the acquiring entity is so much larger than the target that a productivity change induced by the M&A deal and the following relocation of resources between the two is hard to observe in the data of the acquiring rm.
We are thus interested in whether the productivity eects of the tax dierential are more pronounced in the target or the acquirer rm. Bearing in mind the potential measurement errors described above, we estimate a regression model that relates acquirer and target rm TFP to the absolute tax dierential. To capture the evolution of total factor productivity more precisely, we use a panel regression for this purpose. The respective empirical model is specied as follows:
where A jt is the estimated total factor productivity in year t of a rm related to merger j, that is either the combined, the target or the acquirer rm. P OST j,t switches to one in the year after the merger is completed. α 0 thus captures the general impact of the merger on the total factor productivity while α 1 again is the heterogeneity in this eect that is attributed to the tax dierential. X j and Z lk,t are the same vectors of deal, target and acquirer specic variables as dened above. The eect of the time invariant variables is fully captured by rm xed eects and we thus interact X j with a vector of indicators for the post-merger period. Finally, ψ comprises rm-and year-industry-xed eects. The latter capture industry-specic time trends of productivity.
We also check whether we can observe the expected pattern of allocation of productive factors after the merger. This is done by replacing the dependent variable in equation (17) with the logarithms of the employment and tangible xed assets in the target and the acquirer rm. In this estimation, the eect of the absolute tax dierential may not be symmetric. We check this by disaggregating ∆τ jlk into positive and negative dierentials, ∆τ + jlk and ∆τ − jlk as described above. Alternatively, one could use the simple tax dierential instead of the absolute one. However, the underlying assumption for such an estimation is that tax rate dierentials have a symmetric eect on the productivity change which is not necessarily the case as explained above. Using ∆τ + jlk and ∆τ − jlk imposes a less restrictive framework.
In a nal analysis, we verify our results using an event study design. This methodology was originally developed for the nance and accounting literature by Fama et al. (1969) but has since been adjusted and is now widely applied in economic studies (Corrado, 2011) . 14 In general, an event study tracks the behavior of observed individuals around an event which is dened as the M&A deal completion for our purposes. It has two important benets. First, it allows us to explore the timing of distortions in the post-merger adjustment process more systematically. This provides further insights with regard to the underlying mechanism and also informs us about the persistence of these distortions. Second, this method allows us to check whether pre-merger trends in TFP and factor input cause spurious ndings. Ruling out such trends would strengthen the causal inference from our regression results.
For the event study, we adjust the specication of Sandler & Sandler (2014) for our purposes such that the empirical model looks as follows:
The dependent variable y j,t is TFP, labor or capital input of the acquiring, target or the combined rm as described above for the panel regression. It is regressed on a range of dummies D j,t−n which indicate whether the deal in which entity j is involved has been completed in period t − n. Within the rst and last data year, M and N , we dene our event window to 3 years before until 4 years after the merger completion. 15 The end points of this window are open brackets, that is, they indicate whether the merger has been completed 4 or more years before (for the upper window limit) and 3 or more years after a given period (for the lower window limit). This mitigates collinearity with the year-xed eects. The regressor for the period before the merger completion is omitted and normalized to zero such that remaining coecients have to be interpreted relative to the pre-merger year. Our event study specication is augmented by the same set of xed eects and control variables as the panel regression model.
While the coecients of the individual dummies γ n capture the direct eect of the merger on the outcome variables, we are interested in the distortive impact of tax dierentials on this eect. We thus interact the dummies with the absolute tax rate dierential ∆τ jlk and add this set of interactions to the regression model to obtain our coecients of interest α i .
The latter measure how a tax dierential of one percentage point changes the impact of the merger on the outcome variable n years after (if n < 0) or before (if n > 0) the merger completion relative to the year before the M&A is executed. If tax dierentials only aect the adjustment process after the two rms have merged, one should not nd an eect for pre-merger years, that is, we should obtain α n = 0 ∀n > 0.
Productivity Estimation
An important prerequisite for analyzing the eect of within-rm tax dierentials on productivity changes after M&As is a precise estimate of total factor productivity in the involved rms. A common approach is to estimate the parameters of a Cobb-Douglas production function by regressing rm output on the main input factors labor and capital, compute the predicted values and back out total factor productivity as the residual. However, the latter contains both the total factor productivity of the entity and a potential productivity shock which is not observed by the researcher but known to the rm. Since the latter also aects the input choices of the rm, a simultaneity problem arises. Previous studies have addressed this issue by either using investments (Olley & Pakes, 1996) or intermediate inputs (Levinsohn & Petrin, 2003; Wooldridge, 2009) as proxies for the rm expectation regarding future productivity changes.
In this paper, we estimate total factor productivity using rm level data on inputs and outputs from Bureau van Dijk's AMADEUS and ORBIS databases. In doing so, we closely follow Fons-Rosen et al. (2013) who also use ORBIS and apply the Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) procedure. Output is measured as rm value added while inputs are labor, which is the total cost of employees, and capital, which is dened as the total assets of the rm.
Following Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) , rm expectations about future productivity shocks are proxied by intermediate inputs which are measured as the cost of materials.
This approach yields consistent estimates of total factor productivity but is also very demanding in terms of required data. Missing rm level data are imputed as described by Gal (2013) in order ensure a sucient sample size. Before conducting the productivity estimation,
we also check the balance sheet data obtained from Bureau van Dijk for consistency errors.
The relevant steps for constructing the productivity estimation sample are described in detail in Appendix A.1.
We conduct our productivity estimation using the universe of available rms in ORBIS and AMADEUS that reside in either an OECD or an EU member country and contain sucient observations with reliable information on the relevant variables. This sample of 1,366,343 rms with annual data between 2000 and 2013 also contains the acquirer and target rms of interest. We estimate total factor productivity using the Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) method within each 2-digit US SIC code industry. The rm-and year-specic total factor productivities for the rms involved in an M&A during the observation period are then used in the main analysis.
Data
We collect M&A deals from the Zephyr database. An important advantage of Zephyr is that target and acquirer rms are each assigned a unique Bureau van Dijk ID which allows us to match balance sheet data from ORBIS and AMADEUS to the deal-level data and compute total factor productivity before and after the merger. Only deals with rms for which we obtain sucient data to estimate total factor productivity for the year before and the year after the deal completion are used in the estimation. We also exclude nancial and insurance rms 16 and privatizations of state-owned enterprises. We restrict our sample to M&A deals which constitute a full acquisition or a merger to make sure that after the completion of the deal, the management of the combined rm has full control over the target and acquirer assets and thus possesses the means to reallocate the resources. The resulting sample consists of 9,649 rm-year observations for combined rms which are involved in 896 M&A deals. For 885 deals we observe TFP before and after the 16 These are dened as rms with US SIC codes 60-67.
merger for both the acquirer and the target rm. These deals form the estimation sample for our main analysis. Their distribution across acquirer and target countries is summarized in Table 2 . 18% of them are cross-border deals and thus provide the source of variation in the Most of the deals are paid in cash with only 1.2% of stock-for-stock deals in our sample.
Only 10.1% of acquirers are listed on the stock market. In our sample, the absolute tax dierential ranges up to 20.8% with an average of 1.0%. Given that a substantial number of M&As in our sample are domestic deals with no tax dierence, this points to signicant tax dierential among cross-border deals. Indeed, for this sub-group, the average tax dierential is 4.3%. 41% of deals in our sample comprise an acquirer and target location in both of which transfer pricing documentation is not required at the completion of the deal. This gure is also high among cross-border deals with a share of 35.2% involving locations with loose transfer pricing regulations and neither diers much between target and acquirer locations nor between high and low tax locations.
The deal sample is then combined with balance sheet data from the nancial databases of Bureau van Dijk as well as the estimated TFP. Table 4 provides summary statistics for these variables. On average, acquirer rms are slightly more productive than target rms before the merger. This relation reverses after the M&A is completed, possibly pointing at some within-rm reorganization after the merger. As is commonly observed, acquirer and target rms dier substantially in size. In our sample, acquirers are on average about 18 times larger than the target rm in terms of total assets. They are also older and more leveraged. A positive average of the wage dierence suggests that acquirers generally invest in countries with a lower level of labor compensation than in their home location. 
Tax Dierentials and Changes in Total Factor Productivity
Before turning to the results of our econometric analysis, we rst investigate the sample graphically. Figure 1 plots the evolution of TFP of the combined rm before and after the merger. For each particular period it presents the average logarithm of TFP in our sample of merged rms. We dierentiate between mergers with an absolute tax dierential of zero (the blue, solid line) and deals with a positive absolute tax dierential between the acquirer and target location (red, dash-dotted line). Combinations of rms with no dierence in taxation between the two locations are generally more productive. However, this dierence becomes more pronounced after the M&A deal is completed as TFP increases for rms with zero In our regression analysis, we control for these confounding eects. Table 5 presents the main ndings. Column (1) displays results for a parsimonious regression with a set of xed eects as described above but no control variables. The resulting coecient is signicantly negative, suggesting that an increase in the absolute tax dierential reduces the productivity gain after the merger.
We augment the regression by including control variables in columns (2) and (3). Only coecients for the rm-and deal-level variables are displayed while results for the location specic characteristics are relegated to Appendix A.3. The estimation results suggest that hostile M&As (i.e. deals that go ahead without the approval of the target rm's management) generate signicantly lower productivity gains. This may reect that the acquiring rm often faces substantial resistance by executives of the target rm when integrating it after the merger. Furthermore, deals which are nanced via a capital increase also yield lower productivity gains which may be related to the observation that these deals often involve a large number of participants on the acquirer side. Such a consortium may nd it more dicult to make decisions regarding the rm reorganization after the M&A completion.
In column (3), we account for industry-level variation. M&A often coincide with shifts 17 Note however, that a tax dierential of zero does not necessarily imply that the deal is domestic. Some countries have identical tax rates for some time (e.g. Norway and Sweden) while others applied the credit regime with respect to foreign dividends (e.g. the United Kingdom) which, assuming zero withholding taxes, also leads to a zero tax dierential in the case of cross-border acquisitions of targets with lower tax rates relative to the acquirer location. (1), (2), (4) and (5) is the dierence in the logarithm of average productivity after and before the merger. In columns (3) and (6) the dependent variable is the dierence in the logarithm of average productivity before and after the merger relative to the industry mean (SIC 2 digit code). Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) contain regression results with country-level controls for which estimated coecients are reported in Table A .1 in the Appendix. All regressions include target and acquirer country xed eects, target and acquirer industry xed eects and year xed eects. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the acquirer-target country-pair level) are provided in parentheses. Stars behind coecients indicate the signicance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
(1) Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996) . These may, for example, be caused by substantial deregulation within certain industries or an increase in competition that leads to a consolidation in particular production sectors. Any of these events may both be related to changes in productivity and increased foreign acquisition activity within the specic industry, the latter being generally associated with higher tax rate dierentials. For instance, a slowdown in productivity growth of an industry in a particular country makes rms in this industry potential takeover targets for foreign, more competitive rms. This implies larger tax rate dierentials for acquisitions in this industry but also lower productivity gains if the foreign acquisition cannot completely reverse the downward trend in productivity growth.
Ignoring within-industry developments may thus induce a spurious correlation between merger-induced TFP changes and tax rate dierentials that is unrelated to the mechanism suggested in our theoretical model above. We account for this eect by conducting an additional estimation in which we scale the dependent variable by the industry average. In particular, we use the dierence in the logarithm of average productivity before and after the merger relative to the industry mean (SIC 2 digit code). Results are presented in column (3) of Table 5 which otherwise repeats the specications of column (2). The eect of the tax dierential on the change in TFP is still signicantly negative and potentially mitigated by loose transfer pricing regulations. These ndings suggest that our results are robust to accounting for industry trends in productivity and are thus not driven by industry-specic shifts.
In all of the augmented regressions, the coecient for the absolute tax dierential remains signicantly negative. Using regression (2) with the full set of controls and a straight-forward interpretation of the observed eect as a conservative benchmark, we nd that an increase in the absolute tax dierential between acquirer and target location by 1 percentage point drives down the merger-induced productivity gain by about 4.5%.
We complement our analysis in columns (4) to (6) by allowing for dierent coecients for positive and negative tax dierentials. Again, column (4) presents the results for regressing the tax dierentials on the variables of interest and a set of xed eects. The coecient for negative tax dierentials (i.e. tax dierences where the eective tax rate of the target location is below that of the acquirer location) is signicantly negative while the coecient for positive tax dierences is insignicant. This suggests that deals with targets in lowtax jurisdictions drive our main result. When adding control variables in column (5) or controlling for industry-specic trends in column (6), we again obtain the result that deals involving low-tax targets have a particularly negative impact on the post-merger productivity change.
One explanation for this nding is that the potential for productivity improvement is probably higher in the target rm. Thus, negative tax dierences, that induce the management to continue the operation of some less productive units in the target have a more negative impact on overall productivity than positive tax dierences that would only reduce the post-merger productivity gain by a substantial amount if there is a sucient number of units in the acquirer location whose productivity is inferior to that of the corresponding units in the target rm. If generally most of the adjustment takes place in the target rm, one may also refer to asymmetric adjustment costs in factor demand (Hamermesh & Pfann, 1996) as a complementary explanation. Jaramillo et al. (1993) show that the cost for lowering labor demand is much higher than for increasing it and the persistent nature of capital investment implies that downward adjustment is also more expensive for this factor (Pindyck, 1988) . The excessive reduction in resources in the target rm that would be induced by positive tax dierentials is thus likely to be more costly than the relative increase of resources resulting from negative tax dierences, especially if this means that resources remain where they are and no net adjustment takes place. In this setting, negative tax dierences are more likely to have an impact on management decisions and thus aect productivity changes more strongly. (1), (2), (4) and (5) is the dierence in the logarithm of average productivity after and before the merger. In column (3) the dependent variable is the dierence in the logarithm of average productivity before and after the merger relative to the industry mean (SIC 2 digit code). Columns (2)- (5) contain regression results with control variables for which estimated coecients are reported in Table A .2 in the Appendix. All regressions include target and acquirer country xed eects, target and acquirer industry xed eects and year xed eects. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the acquirer-target country-pair level) are provided in parentheses. Stars behind coecients indicate the signicance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) In the next set of regressions, which is presented in Table 6 , we analyze how transfer pricing regulation aects our results. In the regression in column (1) of Table 6 we add the interaction of the tax rate dierential and LOOSE, our indicator for the strictness of transfer pricing regulation, to the benchmark specication displayed in columns (1) to (3) in Table   5 . As before, the coecient of the absolute tax dierential ∆τ is signicantly negative.
The coecient of the interaction between ∆τ and an indicator for loose transfer pricing regulations is signicantly positive. This suggests that the impact of the tax dierential on the productivity change is mitigated if transfer pricing regulation is not very strict and rms are able to reduce the eective tax rate dierence between the locations by engaging in prot shifting activities. Furthermore, our results suggest that if the tax law in the acquirer and the target country either does not contain transfer pricing regulations or does not require rms to provide a written documentation of their transfer pricing system, this may neutralize the eect of the tax dierential. In particular, we cannot reject the hypothesis that α 1 +α 2 = 0 in our sample. 18 This nding is robust to adding control variables and controlling for industry trends in columns (2) and (3), respectively.
Does transfer pricing legislation matter more in the target or in the acquirer location? We answer this question by disaggregating LOOSE into two indicators for the strictness of transfer pricing regulation in the acquirer and the target country, LOOSE Acq and LOOSE T gt .
Results presented in column (4) suggest that legislation in the acquirer location is much more important than in the target location. Given our ndings above, this is not surprising.
Our estimation results in Table 5 indicate that the results are mainly driven by negative tax dierences, that is, when prots of the target are taxed at a lower rate than prots of the acquirer. In this case rms would like to shift prots away from the acquirer location to the target rm. This is what stricter transfer pricing legislation in the former would be implemented to inhibit. On the contrary, raising transfer pricing documentation requirements in the low-tax target location might increase overall transparency but is probably not designed to prevent prot shifting to this location (Bucovetsky & Hauer, 2008) and is therefore less
relevant.
An alternative disaggregation would be to dierentiate between the strictness of transfer pricing legislation in the location with the higher and the lower eective tax rate,
LOOSE
High and LOOSE Low . Results for this approach are presented in column (5) of Table 6 . Consistent with the idea described above that legislation to curb prot shifting via transfer pricing is more important in the high-tax location, we nd that the estimated coecient for LOOSE High is much bigger than the one for LOOSE Low . The latter is not signicantly dierent from zero.
Allocation of Productive Factors
We now extend our analysis to explore the mechanisms that underlie our main result. Inecient reallocations after M&As can take various forms. The management can either allocate too many or too few resources to either the acquirer or the target depending on the sign of the tax dierence between the locations of the two rms. Our theoretical model is not conditional on such biases which has the advantage of very general results but also precludes us from forming any expectations about how the eect evolves in practice. Instead, we rely on empirical evidence to identify particular channels. Table 7 : Panel Regression: Total Factor Productivity OLS regression. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total factor productivity of the combined rm in columns (1)- (2), of the target rm in columns (3)-(4) and the acquirer rm in columns (5)-(6). All regressions include country-level controls for which estimated coecients are reported in Table A .3 in the Appendix. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the rm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include rm and industry-year xed eects. Stars behind coecients indicate the signicance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
(1) Combined Firm For this purpose, we turn to a panel analysis in order to follow the evolution of important determinants of total factor productivity over time. This allows us to control for co-moving variables and general time trends. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 we repeat our main analysis in a panel regression framework to demonstrate that this approach also captures the negative eect of the tax dierential on TFP. The coecient of the interaction between the absolute tax dierence and the post-merger dummy is signicantly negative. This is the case both for positive and for negative tax dierences although we note that negative tax dierences appear to be somewhat more important with a slightly larger magnitude for the corresponding coecient.
Next, we turn to the target rm, that is, instead of the TFP of the combined rm we relate the tax dierential to the estimated TFP of the target rm only. Our results in column (3) suggest, that the productivity gain on the target level is substantially lower when the absolute tax dierential is positive. 19 In particular, we nd that a one percentage point increase in the absolute tax dierence lowers the merged-induced change in target productivity by 4.2%. We also explore whether this result is rather driven by negative or positive tax dierentials, that is, whether lower productivity gains are a result of the target being located in a low-tax or high-tax country with respect to the acquirer location. The results for the corresponding estimation are presented in column (4). The coecient for the interaction of the post-merger dummy with the absolute magnitude of the negative tax dierential, ∆τ − , is negative and highly signicant. In contrast, the coecient for the related interaction with the positive tax dierential, ∆τ + , is only marginally signicant and much smaller in magnitude. This nding suggests that the negative eect of tax dierentials on the post-merger productivity change in the target in our sample is mainly driven by deals where prots received from the target are taxed at a lower rate than those generated in the acquirer country.
We then conduct a similar analysis for the acquiring rm in columns (5) and (6). Our results indicate that tax dierentials have a much smaller impact on acquirer productivity.
With a coecient of -0.02 the estimated eect is less then half the magnitude found for target rms and only marginally signicant. When relating the TFP of the acquirer to negative and positive tax dierentials separately, we do not obtain precise results. The respective coecients are negative but insignicant.
These ndings point to the target rm as the entity within the merged rm where tax dierentials are most harmful for productivity gains. Although the estimated impact of the tax dierential is a novel eect with regard to M&A outcomes, it is not surprising that the main impact relates to the target rm as this is the place where probably most of the reorganization occurs after the merger. How the tax dierential aects this process should also be visible in the data. In our next estimation we therefore trace the evolution of the input factors labor and capital before and after the M&A completion and analyze how their use is aected by tax dierentials.
We begin this analysis with employment and present our ndings in Table 8 . The rst two columns show results with respect to the target rm. A negative, albeit insignicant coecient for the post-merger dummy in column (1) suggests that rms reduce employment in the target rm after the merger. However, this reduction is mitigated when there is a positive absolute tax dierential. The estimation suggests that the post-merger employment cut is reduced by 2% per percentage point of absolute tax dierence. As we focus on the target rm in this estimation, it is again useful to separate the absolute tax dierential into positive and negative tax dierences. We do this in column (2). Consistent with our theoretical explanations above, target employment is mainly aected by negative rather than positive tax dierences. (1)- (2) and the acquirer rm in columns (3)-(4). All regression results contain country-level controls for which estimated coecients are reported in Table A .4 in the Appendix. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the rm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include rm and industry-year xed eects. Stars behind coecients indicate the signicance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
(1) Target Firm The opposite eect is observed with regard to the acquiring rm for which we present results in columns (3) and (4). Higher absolute tax dierentials enhance the post-merger employment cut in the acquirer by 1.9% points for each percentage point in tax dierence.
Again, separating the tax dierential in positive and negative dierences suggests that this result is driven by M&As where a rm in a high-tax country takes over a rm located in a low-tax country.
We repeat this analysis for the other input factor capital which is measured as the logarithm of tangible xed assets. Results are shown in Table 9 where the rst two columns refer to the target rm. Similar to the eect on labor input, the estimation suggests that an increase in the absolute tax dierential has a positive eect on the use of capital in the target after the merger. Furthermore, the signicantly positive coecient of the interaction between the post-merger dummy and ∆τ − in column (2) Turning to capital employment in the acquirer rm we cannot identify a signicant eect of the absolute tax dierential. The corresponding coecient in column (3) is negative but relatively small and not signicant. We also do not nd a signicant impact if we dierentiate between positive and negative dierences. Thus, acquirer rms in our sample do not adjust their post-merger investment policies to tax dierences. On the one hand, this may reect that rms nd it easier to adjust labor input than to decrease or increase capital. On the other hand, acquirer rms are usually much bigger than target rms, especially in terms of assets, and may adjust their capital stock because of various factors unrelated to taxation.
Such noise in the data would prevent us from precisely measuring the eect of the tax dierence on changes in the capital employment of the acquirer following the M&A.
The main channel through which tax dierentials aect the realization of productivity changes in M&As thus appears to be that they reduce the scale of adjustment in the target rm when the tax burden for prots is lower there. Previous empirical studies have already shown that target rms often undergo a period of substantial restructuring after the completion of an M&A (e.g. Maksimovic et al., 2011; Li, 2013) . However, our results suggest that dierences in taxation are relevant with regard to the magnitude and the speed of such adjustments. For instance, our results suggest that rms reallocate less activity away from targets that are located in low-tax locations. This distortion hampers the realization of productivity gains in these rms and thus has a negative impact on the overall productivity gain in the merged enterprise.
We complement our analysis using the event study design described above. Results are displayed in Figure 2 which plots the coecients of the interactions between the event Table 9 : Panel Regression: Capital OLS regression. The dependent variable is the logarithm of tangible xed assets of the target rm in columns (1)-(2) and the acquirer rm in columns (3)-(4). All regression results contain country-level controls for which estimated coecients are reported in Table A .4 in the Appendix. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the rm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include rm and industry-year xed eects. Stars behind coecients indicate the signicance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Assets (1) Target dummies and the tax rate dierential against the number of years relative to the merger completion. In panel (a), the dependent variable is the TFP of the combined rm. After an M&A is completed, TFP declines relative to one year prior to the merger. This decrease is persistent over time and even increases in later periods. Panels (b) and (c) present results for acquirer and target rms separately. For the latter, we observe a signicant decrease in TFP two and three years after the merger. This suggests that the eect of tax rate dierentials on merger-induced productivity continues at least over the medium run. In contrast, there is no eect of tax rate dierentials on TFP of the acquirer neither before nor after the merger.
Turning to the eect of the tax dierential on employment, we observe in panels (d) and (e) that it has opposite directions for the target and the acquirer. Relative to the year before the merger, employment signicantly increases in the target from 2 years after the M&A completion onward. The eect increases over time. For the acquirer, the eect is negative, albeit of much smaller magnitude. It only persists in the short-run but is zero in year 4 after the merger. The impact of tax dierences on capital is less clear-cut. There is a marginally signicant positive eect on target capital two years after the M&A is executed but this quickly reverses. For the acquirer, we nd no signicant change in capital in any postmerger year. These results point to employment as the factor whose adjustment is aected most strongly by tax dierences between target and acquirer rm. At least for the acquirer, these responses are not quickly reversed but continue over a substantial period of time. For capital, the eect is less pronounced which probably reects that adjustment cost is higher for this factor as indicated, for example, by Hall (2004) .
In none of the event study analyses do we observe a signicant response of the outcome variable prior to the merger. 20 This rules out that pre-merger trends in the outcome variable drive our results and strongly points to the M&A completion as the event that triggers the eect of the tax dierential which strengthens the causal interpretation of our results.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate how the productivity change after corporate M&As is aected by dierences in prot taxation between the target and the acquirer location. In our theoretical model, tax dierentials between the locations of rms involved in an M&A distort the post-merger reallocation of productive activity. If tax dierences are large enough, rms assign some activity to units that are less productive but more protable due to a lower tax burden. With respect to overall productivity in the combined rm, this choice is inecient and reduces the productivity gain after the M&A. We then employ rm-level data to test this notion empirically. First, we derive rmlevel estimates of TFP using the Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) method. We then compute the merger-induced change in TFP in the combined rm and relate it to the absolute value of the dierence between the eective tax rate on prots received from the target in the form of inter-corporate dividends and the tax rate applied to prots generated by the acquirer. 20 The graphical observation is conrmed using a Wald test for the joint insignicance of the interaction of the pre-merger dummies with the absolute tax rate dierential.
Our results suggest that an increase in the absolute tax dierential by one percentage point reduces the merger-induced productivity gains by 4.5%. Consistent with our expectation that tax dierentials are less distortive if rms are able to reattribute part of their prot from high-tax to low-tax locations, we nd that the impact of the tax dierential is mitigated when transfer pricing regulations are less strict such that rms can more easily engage in prot shifting. In a complementary analysis, we explore the mechanisms that drive the impact of tax dierences on overall rm productivity. Our ndings indicate that the eect is asymmetric. It is mainly driven by M&A deals where rms located in high-tax countries acquire a rm in a low-tax country and fail to eciently adjust the input factors of production in the target to fully realize the productivity gain. In contrast, tax dierentials that would induce a relocation of activity to the acquirer location have no signicant impact on overall rm productivity. This probably reects the observation that post-merger adjustment relative to rm size is usually much larger in the target entity.
An important limitation to our analysis, which is inherent to many empirical studies of corporate M&A, is that we only observe completed deals. Both potential productivity gains and the tax dierential aect the expected benet from an M&A deal in terms of future prots. These factors may thus inuence whether or not a deal is completed. In particular, we may be less likely to observe M&As with low productivity gains and small tax dierentials because these deals lack two important sources of future benets. Due to the large number of domestic deals, this is, however, not observed in practice. Alternatively, productivity gains and tax rates may interact in their potential to increase post-merger returns. However, they do so only with respect to the level of tax rates in the individual locations. An increase in production is more valuable if the resulting prot is taxed at a lower rate. However, there is no obvious interaction in this regard between productivity gains and the tax rate dierence. Thus, even though our estimations are exposed to biases similar to those of other M&A studies, this is unlikely to drive our empirical results. In particular, the results of an event study analysis reject the presence of pre-merger trends which strengthens the causal inference from our estimations.
The ndings of this paper have several important implications. First, they point to a potential advantage of tax regimes that are neutral with respect to the location of investment.
These are mainly regimes with high domestic corporate tax rates that avoid international double taxation through a credit on foreign tax payments such as the United States. In contrast, systems that exempt foreign prots from domestic taxation usually imply eective international tax dierences. Devereux et al. (2015) suggest higher tax administration costs as a potential motive for switching from a credit to an exemption regime despite the distortive impact of the latter. In the light of our ndings, these benets should, however, be carefully weighted against negative eects on the eciency of international factor allocation.
Second, tax dierentials turn out to be an additional impediment to cross-border knowledge ows that has so far been largely ignored. Given that a large fraction of conventional trade barriers has been eliminated in comprehensive bilateral and multilateral agreements, substantial dierences in tax policy across countries are likely to emerge as an important obstacle to the international transmission of technology.
Finally, while the analysis of rm reactions to international tax competition has so far mostly focused on its relevance for nancial accounting (see Hines Jr, 1999) , our results highlight that dierences in taxation are also harmful in real terms by reducing productivity growth. We show that rms make real adjustments not only with respect to the level of domestic tax rates but also with regard to the international tax system. Furthermore, in contrast to nancial eects such as prot shifting for which tax competition between developed countries and so-called tax havens is an important driver, the real eect that we identify in this paper mainly refers to tax dierentials between developed economies. These are more likely to be linked by real cross-border investments and are thus more exposed to the negative impact of distortive tax rate dierences.
Appendix

A.1 Productivity Estimation Data Sample
We obtain unconsolidated balance sheet data for the productivity estimation from Bureau van Dijk's ORBIS and AMADEUS databases. In a rst step, missing values are imputed as described in Gal (2013) . In particular, rm value added is replaced by the sum of operating revenue and material cost if missing. Conversely, material cost is replaced by the dierence between operating revenue and value added if both items are available.
The second step is to eliminate inconsistent data points from the sample. We drop all rm-year observations with a sum of EBIT and cost of employees that is not strictly positive. Furthermore, we drop observations with negative operating revenue or material cost as well as those with total assets below 1,000 USD. Further potential mistakes in the accounts are captured by deleting extreme outliers. We drop observations for which any of the following ratios lies below the 0.1% or above the 99.9% quantile of the sample within a year: operating revenue to total assets, number of employees to total assets, number of employees to operating revenue, operating revenue less material cost to operating revenue, operating revenue less material cost to number of employees. We also drop observations where the sum of xed intangible assets, xed tangible assets and other xed assets does not add up to a gure that is close to the entry for total xed assets (±5%).
Finally, we adjust the balance sheet items for ination and cross-border dierences in purchasing power to obtain the evolution of productive factors and output in real terms. For this purpose we apply the GDP deator and the Purchasing Power Parity conversion factor for the GDP for 2005 prices to the nominal balance sheet items.
A.2 Choice of Specication
There are several ways to transform the dependent variable in the deal-level regression model. Here, we consider four alternatives: the simple dierence of TFP before and after the merger,Γ jlk = A P ost j − A P re j , the simple dierence scaled by TFP before the merger, We regress each of these measures on the absolute tax dierential ∆τ jlk and a set of xed eects which corresponds to the model estimated in column (1) of Table 5 and plot the tted values against the residuals. These plots are presented in Figure 3 . Among the suggested transformations, only the dierence in logarithms, depicted in the upper left panel, generates a random pattern that is required to assume a linear relationship after transforming the dependent variable. All other transformations generate a non-random pattern of residuals which implies that heteroskedasticity of the error terms is inherent in these models.
A.3 Additional Control Variables (2), (3), (5) and (6) of Table 5 . Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the acquirer-target country-pair level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include rm-and year-xed eects. Stars behind coecients indicate the signicance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Change in Total Factor Productivity (2) (3) Table 7  This table contains the coecients for the OLS regressions of Table 7 . Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the rm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include rm and industry-year xed eects. Stars behind coecients indicate the signicance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
( Tables 8 and 9  This table contains the coecients for the OLS regressions of Table 8 in columns (1a)-(4a) of Table 9 in columns (1b)-(4b). Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the rm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include rm and industry-year xed eects. Stars behind coecients indicate the signicance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
